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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS

December 7, 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: M - Mr. Merchant

This document consists of 1 pages
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
Tom Mann called last night and made the following four points regarding the attached draft, dated December 6, on Cuba.

1. The section on Basic Assumptions commits us to a short time table. I pointed out that this section was written in anticipation of a Special National Intelligence Estimate on the subject which is due Friday, December 9.

2. The last sentence of the Basic Assumptions section (page 2) may be a non-sequitur. I agreed that it might be and said I thought the sentence could be deleted.

3. On page 4, para 2a, Tom felt the training program should be spelled out, particularly with reference to drawing a distinction between training for overt and covert purposes. He agreed that this could be done by means of an additional tab.

4. With regard to para 2b on page 4, Tom estimates there may be 2 to 3 thousand "hard core" Americans who can't be encouraged to leave Cuba under any foreseeable circumstances and that appropriate account should be taken of this. We will pursue this further and see that it is included for consideration in subsequent drafts.


Joseph W. Scott
Special Assistant

Attachment:

As stated.

cc: ARA - Mr. Mann

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS

December 6, 1960

This document consists of 1 pages
numbered 1 of 4, Series A.

233

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Merchant

The first part of the attached paper recommends a program of action in the event field designed to bring about the removal of the Cuban regime.

We now need your reaction to Part One before meeting with Tracy Baker in preparing the second part, which will recommend various actions designed to supplement and reinforce the suggested event program.

* *see also attached letter*
Tom Mann and Hugh Gussing have seen and concurred with Part One.

Joe Scott
Joseph W. Scott
Special Assistant

* Please see attached memo to you setting forth 4 comments Tom made to me regarding the draft paper.

OK - but
1) Assume "basic assumptions"
will be confirmed - DNE when
we'd like to see them, may be
2) For 15 years, you've been
3) I agree that basic assumptions
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December 6, 1960

This document consists of 8 pages
Number 1 of 4 copies, Series A

MEMORANDUM FOR: M - Mr. Merchant

SUBJECT: A Proposed Program for Cuba

(Mason cy 2
Cumming cy 3 } cy 4 to
Tany Barnes)

Part One of this paper recommends a program of action in the overt field designed to bring about the removal of the Castro regime. Part Two recommends covert action designed to supplement and reinforce the suggested program.

PART ONE

I. Basic Assumptions

Time is running against us in the Cuban situation. In the foreseeable future (the next year or so) the degree of effective totalitarian controls over the people in Cuba will rise at a faster rate than will the curve of dissatisfaction and potential resistance to the Castro regime (See Tab A). Economic dislocations will occur but will not lead to the collapse or significant weakening of the Castro regime. Political, social and psychological controls will facilitate any further belt-tightening required. In addition, the Soviet bloc can and will provide the assistance necessary to prevent serious deterioration in the Cuban economy in the short run and to permit an expansion of economic capabilities over the longer term. The Soviet Union will continue to support the military buildup in Cuba and will unstintingly exert its political and military influence—short of risking general war—to sustain the present regime in Cuba (See Tabs B and C).

The Castro regime will continue a course parallel or subservient to the policies of international Communism. It will continue its efforts to undermine the position of the United States and to spread the Castro

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revolution

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revolution in other countries in the Western Hemisphere. Given the serious social and economic pressures building up in most countries of Latin America and the weaknesses of many of the present governments, the chances of the establishment of one or more Castro-like governments over the next year to 18 months are considerable. Indefinite prolongation of the Castro regime and its present policies is intolerable from the standpoint of the national security of the United States.

II. Suggested Solution

Seek through a Meeting of Foreign Ministers commencing February 1, 1961, collective OAS action under the Rio Treaty for severance of diplomatic relations with Cuba, application of economic sanctions, authorization for self-defense activity and increased measures by Member States to protect their borders and strengthen their internal security.

Failing to achieve effective OAS action, and without prejudice to further multilateral effort, seek to persuade as many Latin American states as possible to accompany us in unilateral severance of relations with Cuba and adoption of the foregoing measures. Make known our readiness to respond favorably to requests for naval and air patrol action from governments threatened by Cuban-based aggression.

Promote the establishment of a government-in-exile with control over some portion of the territory of Cuba; seek to persuade other governments to join us in extending recognition thereto as soon as possible after collective or unilateral severance of relations with the Castro regime; and assist through personnel training and other material support the efforts of that group to expand the area under its control to include all of Cuba.

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III. Measures to Implement Proposed Solution

1. Seek Collective Action Through the Organization of American States

The obligations and responsibilities undertaken by the United States as a member of the inter-American system require that every effort be made to bring about a solution of the Cuban problem without resort to intervention. It is therefore incumbent upon us to attempt, in the first instance, to achieve such a solution through the mechanism and procedures of the OAS.

Ideally, we should work to have some one or more Latin American governments take the initiative in calling the meeting of Foreign Ministers and submitting the necessary resolutions aimed at Castro. Should this be impossible, however, the United States should itself take the lead and move forcefully to call such a meeting on February 1, 1961 (Tab F).

At a meeting of Foreign Ministers, member states should be asked to sever diplomatic relations with Cuba until such time as its government and policies cease to represent a threat to the peace, tranquility, stability and security of the inter-American community. In addition to this, member states should be asked to apply thorough going economic sanctions both to imports from Cuba and exports thereto.

Finally, and without prejudice to the right of the United States to act in response to direct requests for assistance, stand-by authorization should be sought for inter-American patrol activity by air and surface craft of member states when necessary to impede movements of men, arms, supplies

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supplies or other instruments of Cuban-sponsored aggression or subversion against another American state.

2. Initiate Unilateral Action by the United States, to include:

a. Cuban Defection Training Program

To insure that any future government in Cuba be competent and more compatible with United States interests, we should begin now to select and train a group of Cubans in government operations and public and international relations. This training, to begin without delay, should be handled in the general context of the new program to be mounted by a Special Commission active of the President for the relief and rehabilitation of the sizeable number of Cuban refugees now concentrated in the Florida area. Such training can be financed from Mutual Security Act funds (Tabs 2 and 3).

b. Severance of Diplomatic Relations

If collective action through the OAS to sever relations with Cuba fails, and if other Latin American states refuse to join us in such action, the United States should unilaterally sever diplomatic relations with the Castro regime.

Prior to severing relations, we should take steps to encourage the departure of U.S. citizens from Cuba, and we should assure that it will not be possible or feasible to maintain consular offices in that country.

Full explanation of our action should be furnished promptly to our NATO allies and through our diplomatic missions to governments around the world. All instruments of diplomacy and propaganda should be focused

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be focused on all-out effort to secure if not parallel action at least worldwide understanding and support of our step.

c. Economic Sanctions

Immediately following the severance of diplomatic relations, we should institute economic sanctions against Cuba. Export controls already in effect should be further strengthened by elimination of exemptions now provided for unsubstantiated foodstuffs and medicines. Authorization should be obtained to impede the flow of Cuban imports into this country; financial controls should be applied to all transactions involving Cuba; and our NATO allies should be asked to institute COCCO-type controls against Cuba.

d. Recognition of Cuban Government-in-Exile

Immediately upon breaking relations with the Castro regime we should be prepared to recognize a Government-in-exile. To this end, we should begin now quietly to select a junta which would be qualified to form the nucleus for an acceptable political alternative for the Cuban people and to represent the core of a successor government (Tab G). It is essential that the junta be able to attract the support of large numbers of Cubans within Cuba as well as outside. In addition, it should be able to command the support of a military force able to establish a perimeter on the island of Cuba and hold it until outside aid is available. The junta should be told that when this point is reached, the United States would respond favorably to reasonable requests for help in the form of:

- (1) military supplies and equipment,
- (2) civilian emergency aid (of Red Cross type),

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- (3) financial assistance,
- (4) diplomatic support, and
- (5) press and other news media support. (Tab H)

A carefully developed campaign should be started, as soon as an acceptable government-in-exile announces itself publicly, to build up the public image of its leaders and to line up Latin American support for that government. Similar efforts ultimately will be necessary in the UN (Tab F).

e. Grant Assistance to Government-in-Exile

Having extended recognition, the United States should encourage other friendly governments to follow suit. It should maintain open contact with leaders of the government-in-exile and should assist them in their approaches to other governments with appropriate requests for equipment, supplies, facilities, and financial assistance. Additionally, those Cuban refugees trained or rehabilitated in this country prior to establishment of the government-in-exile should be encouraged to place themselves at its disposal and to work with it in preparing for eventual return to Cuba and assumption of governing responsibilities.

f. Prevention of Movement of Arms and Men from Cuba to OAS Member States and/or Naval Blockade of Cuba

Consideration should be given to the establishment of a cordon sanitaire around Cuba. The moral and legal position of the United States would be considerably better if we were to act in response to the request of other member states. Therefore, the United States should announce publicly

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publicly and readiness to respond favorably to requests for naval and air
patrol action from governments threatened by Cuban-based aggression.

and
in the event that war prove necessary/feasible we
should consider the possibility of instituting a naval blockade
(Data 10-10-61).

PAGE TWO

(Part Two to be supplied by Agency.)

IV. Recommendations

1. That before any action approval be obtained from the Secretary,
the Special Group, and the President for the course of action outlined
herein to bring about through collective action if possible and unilateral
action if necessary the replacement of the present Cuban Government with
one compatible and acceptable from the standpoint of United States
interests.

2. That, if the above approval is obtained, the concurrence of the
President-Elect be sought.

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JW: M'Dean
JW: M'Dorian

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TRANSCRIPTION FOLLOWS

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Under Secretary for Political Affairs

December 7, 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: M – Mr. Merchant

Tom Mann called last night and made the following four points regarding the attached draft, dated December 6, on Cuba.

1. The section on Basic Assumptions commits us to a short time table. I pointed out that this section was written in anticipation of a Special National Intelligence Estimate on the subject which is due Friday, December 9.
2. The last sentence of the Basic Assumptions section (page 2) may be a non-sequitur. I agreed that it might be and said I thought the sentence could be deleted.
3. On page 4, para 2a, Tom felt the training program should be spelled out, particularly with reference to drawing a distinction between training for overt and covert purposes. He agreed that this could be done by means of an additional tab.
4. With regard to para 2b on page 4, Tom estimates there may be 2 to 3 thousand "hard core" Americans who can't be encouraged to leave Cuba under any foreseeable circumstances and that appropriate account should be taken of this. We will pursue this further and see that it is included for consideration in subsequent [sic] drafts.

Joseph W. Scott
Special Assistant

Attachment:

As stated.

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Under Secretary for Political Affairs

December 6, 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: M – Mr. Merchant

The first part of the attached paper recommends a program of action in the event field designed to bring about the removal of the Castro regime.

We now need your reaction to Part One before meeting with [illegible] in preparing the second part, which will recommend covert actions designed to supplement and reinforce the suggested overt program.

Tom Mann* and Hugh Cumming (see attached initialed [illegible]) have seen and concurred with Part One.

Joseph W. Scott
Special Assistant

[The following is handwritten:]

*Please see attached memo to you setting forth 4 comments Tom made to me regarding the draft paper.

JWS –
OK – but

- 1) I assume "basic assumptions" will be [illegible] SNIE where [illegible].
- 2) Feb 15 [illegible]
- 3) I agree [illegible] of basic assumptions.
[illegible]

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December 6, 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: M – Mr. Merchant

[illegible]: A [illegible] Program for Cuba

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PART ONE

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The Castro regime will continue a course parallel or subservient to the policies of international Communism. It will continue its efforts to undermine the position of the United States and to spread the Castro revolution to other countries in the Western Hemisphere. Given the serious social and economic pressures building up in most countries of Latin America and the weaknesses of many of the present governments, the chances of the establishment of one or more Castro-like governments over the next year to [illegible]. Indefinite prolongation of the Castro regime and its present policies is intolerable from the standpoint of the national security of the United States.

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Finally, and without prejudice to the right of the United States to act in response to direct requests for assistance, stand-by authorization should be sought for inter-American patrol activity by air and surface craft of member states when necessary to impede movements of men, arms, supplies or other instruments of Cuban-sponsored aggression or subversion against another American state.

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Consideration should be given to the establishment of a cordon sanitaire around Cuba. The moral and legal position of the United States would be considerably better if we were to act in response to the request of other member states. Therefore, the United States should announce publicly the readiness to respond favorably to requests for naval and air patrol action from governments threatened by Cuban-based aggression. [illegible] that may prove necessary /and feasible we should [illegible] possibility of instituting a naval blockade (Tabs [illegible] and [illegible]).

PART TWO

(Part Two to be supplied by Agency.)

IV. Recommendations

1. That necessary policy approval be obtained from the Secretary, the Special Group, and the President for the course of action outlined herein to bring about through collective action if possible and unilateral action if necessary the replacement of the present Cuban Government with one compatible and acceptable from the standpoint of United States interests.

2. That, if the above approval is obtained, the concurrence of the President-Elect be sought.